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SAFEGUARDING DEMOCRACY IN
EUROPE: A BULWARK AGAINST
HUNGARY’S SUBVERSION OF CIVIL
SOCIETY
INTRODUCTION

O

n February 18, 2018, the Prime Minister of Hungary,
Viktor Orbán, addressed his citizenry with an ominous
message: Hungary and Europe were on the precipice of ruin.1
Since 2015, Europe has faced a migrant crisis unprecedented in
recent decades, largely stemming from regional conflicts and
atrocities in the Middle East and Africa that have given rise to
vast incidents of forced displacement and refugee resettlement.2
In his State of the Nation address, Orbán warned about the dangers of accepting those seeking refuge from predominantly Muslim-majority states and prophesized, “[i]f things continue like
this, our culture, our identity and our nations as we know them
will cease to exist. Our worst nightmares will have become reality. The West will fall, as Europe is occupied without realizing
it.”3 Orbán subsequently admonished his fellow European governments, lamenting, “[t]hey want us to adopt their policies: the
policies that made them immigrant countries and that opened
the way for the decline of Christian culture and the expansion of
Islam.”4 Orbán’s address underscored his nationalistic ideals,
and his unabashed anti-immigrant rhetoric highlighted Hungary’s position at odds with the values held by the broader European community.
Since that State of the Nation address, Orbán’s government
has matched proclamation with policy. In summer 2018, the
Hungarian Parliament passed two separate, but parallel legis1. Viktor Orbán, Hung. Prime Minister, State of the Nation Address (Feb.
18, 2018), in Viktor Orbán’s “State of the Nation” Address, WEBSITE HUNGARIAN
GOV’T (Feb. 19, 2018), http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/theprime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-state-of-the-nation-address.
2. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The Sea Route to Europe: The Mediterranean Passage in the Age of Refugees, 2 3 (July 1, 2015), available at
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5595045a4.html.
3. Orbán, supra note 1.
4. Specifically, Orbán referenced the immigration policies of Belgium, Germany, and France and promised to oppose European governments he claimed
promote post-national systems of governance. Id.
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lative acts: the first, a bundle of laws referred to as the Stop Soros bills;5 the second, a constitutional amendment decreeing
Hungary to be a state where no foreign population can resettle.6
The Stop Soros bills function to criminalize the provision of assistance to illegal immigrants by Civil Society Organizations
(CSOs),7 while the amendment to Hungary’s Constitution prohibits the resettlement of foreign populations within Hungary8
and limits asylum only to those who enter Hungary directly from
their country of origin.9 As Hungary is a landlocked state, this
constitutional amendment virtually eliminates the availability
of legal immigration status to refugees and asylees and, consequently, expands the scope of the Stop Soros bills. Orbán punctuated his anti-immigrant efforts on July 20, 2018, when the
Parliament adopted a new special tax amendment imposing a 25
percent tax on civil society funding that supports or promotes
immigration.10
This Note will analyze Hungary’s recent immigration legislation in the context of its obligations under the European Union

5. This nomenclature comes from the text of the General Reasoning following the provisions of the bills themselves. GOV’T OF HUNG., BILL NO. T/333,
AMENDING CERTAIN LAWS RELATING TO MEASURES TO COMBAT ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION (May 2018), https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T333ENG.pdf (unofficial English translation of Bill and explanatory memorandum).
[hereinafter BILL NO. T/333].
6. Vanessa Romo, Hungary Passes ‘Stop Soros’ Laws, Bans Aid to Undocumented
Immigrants, NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO (June
20,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/20/622045753/hungary-passes-stop-soros-lawsbans-aid-to-undocumented-immigrants.
7. Civil society refers to organizations and communities that work collaboratively towards a shared, often public interest-related, goal. Commonly referred to as the “third sector” of a state, civil society operates distinctly from,
and at times in opposition to, governmental and business sectors within society. Adam Jezard, Who and What is ‘Civil Society?’, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 23,
2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/what-is-civil-society/.
8. Romo, supra note 6.
9. GOV’T OF HUNG., BILL NO. T/332, SEVENTH AMENDMENT OF THE BASIC LAW
OF HUNGARY, art. 5 (May 2018), https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/T332-Constitution-Amendment-29-May-2018-ENG.pdf (unofficial English translation of Bill and explanatory memorandum).
10. GOV’T OF HUNG., BILL NO. T/625, AMENDING CERTAIN TAX LAWS AND
RELATED LAWS, ON THE SPECIAL TAX ON IMMIGRATION, ch. X, § 250 (June 2018),
https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/t-625.pdf [hereinafter BILL NO.
T/625].
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(EU) treaties11 and the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).12 It will argue that Hungary’s anti-immigration laws
dismantle the role and scope of civil society in Hungary and violate the rights of CSOs to freedom of expression and freedom of
association in contravention of both EU institutional law13 and
the ECHR.14 As such, it is imperative that the EU and the Council of Europe intervene in defense of democracy and send the
message that autocracy and state-sponsored xenophobia, even
under the veil of nationalism, will not be tolerated.
Part I of this Note will survey Hungary’s political landscape
following its emergence out of Soviet rule and the contemporaneous rise of nationalist ideologies. It will also highlight Orbán’s
election and subsequent aggrandizement of consolidated political influence to the detriment of Hungary’s democratic institutions. Part II will map the European migration crisis of 2015
both generally and specifically in regard to Hungary, followed by
a chronology of EU collective response initiatives and Hungary’s
deviations from those EU mandates. In Part III, this Note will
discuss the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (“the Charter”)
and the Council of Europe’s ECHR provisions on freedom of expression and freedom of association and how Hungary’s laws facially violate those rights. Part IV will analyze the permissible
derogations from Hungary’s ECHR obligation to ensure freedom
11. In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty was enacted by EU member states to amend
its foundational treaties and grant “treaty-like status” to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Stephen C. Sieberson, Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon, 50
VA. J. INT’L L. 919, 921 22 (2010). After 2009, the main legal bases of EU law
are the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, which outline the functioning and institutional laws of the
EU, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, outlining human and civil rights
obligations. Id.
12. The institutional bodies of the European Union include the EU Commission, Parliament, and Council of the European Union. The latter is not to be
confused with the Council of Europe, a separate organization that predates the
EU and has more state members, including Russia. The Council of Europe
oversaw the drafting and subsequent enforcement of the ECHR. For more information distinguishing the EU and the Council of Europe, see Do Not Get
Confused, COUNCIL EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused?desktop=true (last visited Jan. 12, 2019).
13. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 11 12,
June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 59 [hereinafter The Charter].
14. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 10 11, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
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of expression and association, and how Hungary’s laws fail to
meet the standard of such exemptions, ultimately violating
those fundamental democratic rights. Finally, Part V will lay out
proposals for two avenues of legislative and judicial punitive action and redress in response to Hungary’s violations. These avenues will address the specific mechanisms available in relation
to the violated treaty, either the Charter or the ECHR. Accordingly, each proposal will demonstrate options available to different agents, including CSOs, the EU, and individual member
states.
I. POLITICAL CONTEXT IN HUNGARY: FROM SOVIET RULE TO
ORBÁN
Orbán and his conservative Fidesz Party came to power during
Hungary’s 2010 elections,15 garnering him the prime ministership and the party a two-thirds majority in the Parliament.16
This majority empowered Orbán, as Prime Minister and head of
the ruling party, to make drastic changes to the Hungarian political and legal landscape.17 Within one year, the Orbán government eliminated a rule requiring a four-fifths majority for Parliament to vote on constitutional changes, consequently enabling
itself to write an entirely new constitution.18 Promulgated in
2012, the new Fundamental Law of Hungary proclaimed Christianity as the foundation of Hungarian values, granted increased authority to the governing party, and reduced the efficacy of institutional limits on that power.19

15. Orbán had previously been Prime Minister of Hungary from 1998 to
2002, leading a coalition government where no party had dominant power. Kim
Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 549 n.10 (2018).
16. James Mark et al., After 1989 Remembering the End of State Socialism
in East-Central Europe, in THINKING THROUGH TRANSITION: LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIAN PASTS, AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY IN EAST
CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER 1989 463, 469 (Michal Kopeček & Piotr Wciślik eds.,
2015).
17. Id. at 470.
18. Miklós Bánkuti et al., Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 139 (2012).
19. Mark et al., supra note 16, at 470; Translated text of the Fundamental
Law of Hungary can be found at The Fundamental Law of Hungary, WEBSITE
HUNGARIAN GOV’T (Apr. 25, 2011),
https://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf.
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Through the new Constitution, Orbán and the Fidesz Party
paved the way for autocratic governance by constricting the
power of the judiciary and the media and undermining fair elections.20 Orbán handicapped the ability of the Constitutional
Court to effectively check the government by reducing the court’s
jurisdiction over budgetary matters and increasing the number
of judges from eight to fifteen.21 This empowered Orbán to appoint seven new judges, nearly half of the court, thus heavily
shifting power and control in favor of the Fidesz Party and its
interests.22 After diminishing judicial power over the budget,
Orbán established a Budgetary Commission and filled it with
Fidesz Party members, giving the party long-lasting control over
the national economy.23
The Prime Minister strengthened his autocratic rule further
by weakening democratic election processes.24 Orbán invalidated laws mandating partisan diversity in the Election Commission25 and immediately filled the majority of seats with
Fidesz Party members, giving his own party control of monitoring elections and granting referendums.26 The government further undermined the electoral process through a 2013 constitutional amendment that stated in part:
In order to guarantee the conditions for the formation of a democratic public opinion, political parties which have a nationwide support and other organizations that nominate candidates must be provided free and equal access, as defined in a
Cardinal Act, to political advertising in public media outlets
during elections for Members of Parliament and Members of
the European Parliament. Cardinal Act may limit the publication of other forms of political campaign. 27

20. Scheppele, supra note 15, at 549 50.
21. Bánkuti et al., supra note 18.
22. Id. at 140.
23. David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 536 (2018).
24. Bánkuti et al., supra note 18, at 140.
25. This Commission is tasked with overseeing election fairness, previously
required to have opposition party members on the commission. Id.
26. Id.
27. OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENT, T/9929, FOURTH AMENDMENT TO HUNGARY’S
FUNDAMENTAL LAW art. 5 (Feb. 8, 2013), https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/Fourth%20Amendment%20to%20the%20FL%20Eng%20Corrected.pdf.

894

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:2

This provision prohibited private media coverage of election
propaganda and effectively granted the government control of
campaign coverage by limiting it to public, state-owned media
sources.28
Prime Minister Orbán’s consolidation of power and steady
march towards authoritarianism stand in stark contrast with
the democratic ideals of 1990s post-Soviet Hungary.29 After the
fall of the Soviet Union, Hungarian ethos celebrated the longawaited triumph of democracy over Communist occupation.30
The seeming paradox of Hungary’s return to near authoritarianism, however, is not an isolated outlier among post-Communist
states whose civil societies had been throttled under Soviet
rule.31 Parallel trajectories have notably occurred in Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.32 Post-Communist states are particularly vulnerable to reverting to autocratic or authoritarian
rule in part because they lack the tradition and historical underpinning of established democratic institutions.33 Without proven
and robust democratic foundations, states transitioning out of
communism have been less equipped to withstand political tumult and instability, enabling strong centralized leaders to gain
power.34 It is necessary to note this underlying vulnerability of

28. Dan Van Raemdonck et al., Hungary: Democracy Under Threat, FIDH,
Nov.
2016,
at
22,
available
at
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/hungary_democracy_under_threat.pdf.
29. Mark et al., supra note 16, at 464.
30. A central, unifying moment in Hungarian collective memory was the
thwarted 1956 Revolution. Hungarian dissidents cut the Soviet symbol out
from the center of their national flags and led coordinated uprisings throughout Budapest and the countryside, attempting to push out Soviet occupiers and
establish a democratic government under Imre Nagy. The uprising was quelled
by Soviet troops, leading to a brutal period of retaliation on the part of the
Soviet Union against the leaders of the uprising and anyone proven to have
been involved. For more, see U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 18 (1957); Rep.
of the Special Comm. on the Problem of Hung., 125 30, 233, U.N. Doc. A/3592
(1957).
31. Peter Wilkin, The Rise of ‘Illiberal’ Democracy: The Orbánization of
Hungarian Political Culture, 24 J. WORLD SYS. RES. 5, 11 (2018).
32. Id. at 12.
33. Bojan
Bugaric̆, A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe:
“Lands In-Between”
Democracy and Authoritarianism,
13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 219, 223 (2015).
34. Id. at 244.
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burgeoning democracies in the aftermath of authoritarian occupation in order to recognize the extent to which Orbán has consolidated power and to underscore the need for external action.
II. THE MIGRANT CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT THROUGHOUT EUROPE
Spurred in large part by a mounting crisis in Syria, record
numbers of refugees and asylum seekers arrived in Europe in
2015.35 The number of asylum applicants in 2015 and 2016 more
than doubled from 2014, increasing from 627,000 to more than
1.3 million in 2015 and 1.2 million in 2016.36 In a Pew Research
Center study of the number of asylum applicants per 100,000
people in the receiving country’s population, Hungary received
the most applicants compared to other European countries.37 A
total of 174,000 applicants sought asylum in Hungary in 2015,
second only to the 442,000 in Germany.38 The majority of applicants arrived from Syria, followed by Iraq and Afghanistan.39
Since 2016, the total number of applicants arriving in Europe
has steadily declined, reaching just over 700,000 in 2017,40 but

35. Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015, PEW
RES. CENTER (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-ofrefugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/.
36. Asylum Statistics, EUROSTAT (Mar. 12, 2019), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics.
37. Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015, supra note 35.
38. Germany received the highest total number of asylum applicants irrespective of population size. Id.
39. Id.
40. Asylum Statistics, supra note 36.
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the impact on European geopolitics and daily life has been immediate and drastic.41 The disparate responses among EU member states emphasized deep political and ideological fractures
within the EU concerning resettlement.42
A. European Union Coordinated Efforts to Address Asylees and
Refugees
Laws and policies responding to asylees and refugees fall under the purview of both member states and the EU collectively.43
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
contains express provisions mandating the acceptance of asylees
and refugees44 in accordance with the Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Refugee Convention”).45

41. Most notably, states have had to grapple with housing shortages, increased demand for public social services, unaccompanied children, language
barriers, and difficulties providing programming for assimilation. ALFONSO
LARA MONTERO & DOROTHEA BALTRUKS, EUR. SOC. NETWORK, THE IMPACT OF
THE REFUGEE CRISIS ON LOCAL PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES 9 12 (2016),
https://www.esn-eu.org/sites/default/files/publications/Refugee_Briefing_paper_FINAL.pdf. Furthermore, the migrant crisis highlighted deep fissures
within the EU regarding foreign policy and shared migration responsibilities,
and brought tensions of national identity and international obligations bubbling back to the surface. Matthew Karnitschnig, Migration Reopens EU’s Political Divide, POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/migration-reopens-eu-political-divide/.
42. How is the Migrant Crisis Dividing EU Countries?, BBC (Mar. 4, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34278886.
43. E.U. AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN LAW
RELATING TO ASYLUM, BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION 35 (2014).
44. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 78, June 7, 2016, 2018 O.J. (C 202) 1 [hereinafter TFEU].
45. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol codify the customary law principle of nonrefoulement, mandating that
a refugee cannot be returned to a state where their life or liberty would be
threatened. The Convention defines a refugee as someone who,
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having
a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

2019]

Safeguarding Democracy in Europe

897

Furthermore, the Schengen acquis,46 ratified by all but four EU
member states, guarantees open borders throughout much of the
EU, with external borders protected by national patrol.47
This unobstructed internal travel mandate prompted the EU
to develop a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) overseen by the European Asylum Support Office and codified in the
TFEU Article 78.48 In actualizing CEAS, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union enacted a series of
laws in 2013, including the Dublin Regulation and the Eurodac
Regulation.49 The Dublin Regulation sets forth member state obligations and responsibilities in regard to receiving refugees,50
and the Eurodac Regulation mandates fingerprinting refugees
to facilitate that process.51
In response to the overwhelming number of refugees arriving
via the Mediterranean, the EU developed a quota system to disperse over 150,000 refugees throughout its member states in order to alleviate pressure on coastal states, particularly Italy and
Greece.52 The quota system was established in 2015 and delegated 1,294 refugees to Hungary that year. 53 Despite the new
binding protocol, Hungary refused to admit a single asylum
seeker mandated by the quota system.54

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(2), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
46. The Schengen acquis is an agreement among twenty-two EU member
states, including Hungary, and four non-EU states in the Schengen border to
have open borders internally and coordinated border control over external borders. Migration and Home Affairs, Europe Without Borders: The Schengen
Area, at 4, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/schengen_brochure/schengen_brochure_dr3111126_en.pdf.
47. Maryellen Fullerton, Borders, Bans, and Courts in the European Union,
23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 393, 396 (2018).
48. Eur. Asylum Support Office, An Introduction to the Common European
Asylum System for Courts and Tribunals, 13 (Aug. 2016), https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/BZ0216138ENN.PDF; TFEU, supra note 44,
art. 78.
49. Eur. Asylum Support Office, supra note 48, at 17.
50. 2013 J.O. (L 180) 31.
51. 2013 J.O. (L 180) 1, 7.
52. Europe Migrant Crisis: EU Court Rejects Quota Challenge, BBC (Sept.
8, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41172638.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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B. Hungary’s Response to the Migrant Crisis and the EU’s Mandates
Hungary’s response to the influx of asylum seekers throughout
Europe was swift and absolute. By fall 2015, Hungary had
erected a fence along its borders with Croatia and Serbia, and it
continued to lengthen and strengthen its border protection
through April 2017.55 As walls popped up along the EU external
borders, the structure of the Schengen acquis began to crumble.
Slovakia and Hungary reinstituted border controls, as did Germany and Austria.56
In addition to constructing walls, Hungary also built billboards.57 In a national propaganda campaign vilifying immigrants, Hungary erected scores of billboards warning refugees
not to come to Hungary to allegedly steal jobs and commit
crime.58 While the billboards, written in Hungarian, had a minimal deterrent effect on the predominantly Middle Eastern refugees, they fulfilled their primary purpose: to instill fear among
native born Hungarians.59 The billboards promulgated a widespread fear that immigrants would steal jobs and commit acts of
terror if they were permitted within Hungary’s borders.60
Hungary was also one of only four EU member states to vote
against the refugee quota system and, after its passage, complained on the grounds that it was unprecedented for a majority
vote to decide matters of state sovereignty.61 Along with Slovakia, Hungary took the issue to the European Court of Justice.62 Ultimately, the court ruled against Hungary and Slovakia
and affirmed the quota system.63 Hungary has since protested

55. Fullerton, supra note 47, at 400.
56. Id. at 402.
57. Timea Drinoczi & Agoston Mohay, Has the Migration Crisis Challenged
The Concept Of The Protection Of The Human Rights Of Migrants? The Case
Of Ilias And Ahmed v. Hungary, in IRREGULAR MIGRATION AS A CHALLENGE FOR
DEMOCRACY 100 (Elzbieta Kuzelewska et al. eds., 2017).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. A Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey documented that Hungarians
topped the list of European populations who feared immigrants posed a threat
to national security and state economy. Id.
61. Europe Migrant Crisis: EU Court Rejects Quota Challenge, supra note
52.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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the ruling as effectively being a violation of its sovereignty.64
Further, the Hungarian Foreign Minister proclaimed after the
ruling that Hungary’s stance on the quota system had not
changed, despite the unfavorable court decision.65
III. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION: HUNGARY’S
PRIMA FACIE VIOLATIONS
Hungary has remained steadfast in its opposition to accepting
asylum seekers and refugees, as demonstrated in the state Parliament. The Stop Soros bills, officially Bill No. T/333, are a series of amendments to pre-existing domestic law that have the
express function of enhancing Hungary’s ability to thwart unlawful immigration, though in practice they have been applied
to impede virtually all immigration.66 Article 9 of the Stop Soros
bills contains an amendment to Act C of the 2012 Penal Code
Section 353/A.67 Notably, this is the Penal Code chapter dealing
with crimes against public order.68
The first change to Section 353/A was a new subheading,
which now reads: “Facilitating Illegal Immigration.”69 The law
was then substantively amended to make it a misdemeanor offense, pursuant to Subsection 1, for “[a]nyone who conducts organizational activities” that assist a foreign national in initiating asylum proceedings if they did not suffer persecution on the
enumerated grounds to warrant asylum in either “their country
of origin or in the country of their habitual residence or another
country via which they had arrived. . . .”70 The amendment thus
criminalizes organizations that facilitate asylum applications
and procedures for anyone who does not meet the standard of a
refugee as defined by the Refugee Convention, but adds additional language to require persecution in countries through
which refugees travel en route to seeking asylum in Hungary.71
This limits refugee status beyond the scope of the Refugee Con-

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
BILL NO. T/333, supra note 5.
Id. § 353/A.
Id. at Detailed Reasoning, § 11.
Id. § 353/A.
Id. § 353/A(1)
Id.
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vention by imposing a requirement that refugees must flee continuous persecution from their country of origin through transitional states along their journey in order to warrant asylum.
The remaining subsections of Section 353/A, namely Subsections 2 and 5, increase the scope of the unlawful conduct set out
in Subsection 1. Subsection 2 makes punishable by up to one
year of imprisonment the provision of financial support to facilitate the crimes of Subsection 1, as well as the regular continuance of those criminal acts.72 The detailed reasoning relating to
that provision explains that “[r]egular perpetration means at
least two offenses with a short period of time in between them,
in accordance with established practice.”73 This clarifies, in part,
the constituent requirements of regular and continued offenses
to Subsection 1, but is ambiguous in regard to the meaning of
“established practice” and “a short period of time.” Subsection 5
further outlines an expansive definition of constituent activities
encompassed within the meaning of “organi[z]ational activity”
related to the facilitation of asylum processes as prohibited in
Subsection 1.74 Sections 353/A(5)(b) and (c) reveal that included
within the penumbra of prohibited organizational activity is the
following conduct: “[b] [Anyone who] prepares or distributes information materials or commissions such activities, [or] [c]
builds or operates a network.”75 Such specifications are simultaneously excessively broad and entirely opaque.
The amendments to the tax law follow a similarly abstruse
vein. Bill No. T/625 amends Hungarian tax law, with specific
provisions including a “special tax on immigration.”76 Section
250 imposes a 25 percent tax on any “financial support of an immigration supporting activity.”77 It includes within “immigration supporting activity” a broad plethora of conduct, such as developing and maintaining networks and any media messaging
that “portray[s] immigration in a positive light,” which the law
sweepingly labels as propaganda.78

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. § 353/A(2).
Id. at Detailed Reasoning, §11.
Id. § 353/A(5).
Id.
BILL NO. T/625, supra note 10, § 250.
Id. § 250(1) and (4).
Id. § 250 (2).
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The Stop Soros bills and the immigration tax expressly outline
the reasoning behind amending the laws.79 The Parliament justified imposing criminal sanctions on CSOs working in immigration under the guise of protecting public order and security, arguing that immigration poses a national security threat and
CSOs that assist immigration are acting, effectively, as accessories.80 The Parliament’s explicit reasoning for the tax bill posited
that immigration supporting activities increase the rate of immigration and, therefore, cost Hungarian society and the state
money related to such “discharge of public burdens.”81
The combined effect of the bills adversely impacts the dissemination of information and formation of partnerships that are integral to the functioning of civil society and foundational to the
freedoms of expression and association. Those freedoms are echoed in both the ECHR and the Charter, though Article 52(3) of
the Charter provides that the scope of each right shall be read
in accordance with the meaning of the ECHR.82 As such, this
Note will analyze Hungary’s violations of freedom of expression
and association in the context of the ECHR, though the analysis
equally applies to the Charter.
A. The Stop Soros Bills and the Immigration Tax Restrict
CSO’s Freedom of Expression
The ECHR expressly provides for the freedom of expression.
Article 10(1) of the ECHR, in relevant part, reads as such: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers.”83 In its General Considerations on Article 10, the Council of Europe emphasizes the right to freely impart and receive information as fundamental to a functioning

79. BILL NO. T/333, supra note 5, at General Reasoning; BILL NO. T/625, supra note 10, at Detailed Reasoning.
80. BILL NO. T/333, supra note 5, at General Reasoning and Detailed Reasoning, §11.
81. BILL NO. T/625, supra note 10, at Detailed Reasoning.
82. The Charter, supra note 13, art. 52(3).
83. ECHR, supra note 14, art. 10.
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democracy.84 Encompassed within this right is the ability to criticize the government.85 Furthermore, the right entails the freedom to access information necessary for a public to be “adequately informed, particularly on matters of public interest,”
and prior European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence holds that, in the interest of the “legitimate gathering of
information on a matter of public importance . . . the law cannot
allow arbitrary restrictions which may become a form of indirect
censorship.”86 The court considers, in its calculus concerning the
right to information, the party’s intention to contribute the information to the “public debate on good governance.”87 Such
dicta emphasizes the court’s concern that censorship, especially
when arbitrarily imposed through law, undermines a state’s
democratic functions.88
The Stop Soros bills prohibit the creation and circulation of information about the immigration and asylum processes in Hungary if that information may assist in the filing of a meritless
application.89 These provisions contravene the ECHRguaranteed freedom to “receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by the public authority. . . .”90 While
the prohibition is limited to information sharing that facilitates
an asylum application in instances where the applicant does not
meet the standard of a refugee, it does not specify how directly
the information must be distributed or when the merits of the
claim must be determined.91 The fluid nature of information
means it may reach meritorious and non-meritorious applicants
alike. Additionally, the merit of an application often cannot be
84. DOMINIKA BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, COUNCIL OF EUR., PROTECTING THE
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (2017), https://rm.coe.int/handbook-freedom-of-expressioneng/1680732814.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 15 16.
87. Id. at 16.
88. Importantly, the Council of Europe and the ECtHR have noted specific
enumerated incidents of speech and expression that are not protected by Article 10. These include incitement to violence, hate speech, racism, Holocaust
denial, and promoting the ideologies of Nazism. While Article 10 also includes
a provision permitting certain restrictions on the freedom of expression, it is
important to note that the express limits do not include disseminating information regarding immigration. Id. at 23 30.
89. BILL NO. T/333, supra note 5, § 353/A(5)(b).
90. ECHR, supra note 14, art. 10.
91. BILL NO. T/333, supra note 5, § 353/A(1).
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determined with finality until it has undergone judicial review.92
As a result, the provision effectively threatens to criminalize any
and all CSO activity related to immigration and asylum.
The tax law similarly quells the dissemination of information
by threatening severe economic repercussions for CSOs providing immigration services.93 It goes further than the Stop Soros
bills to include a tax on any media messaging that is a positive
representation of immigration as a whole, not just illegal immigration.94 This distinction underscores the true motive of the
bills: to block support channels for immigration in general, not
just when it is deemed unlawful.
B. The Stop Soros Bills and the Immigration Tax Restrict
CSO’s Freedom of Association
The ECHR expressly provides for the freedom of assembly and
association. Article 11(1) of the ECHR, in relevant part, reads as
such: “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and to freedom of association with others.”95 The Venice Commission, the advisory body for the Council of Europe, and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) jointly created an interpretive guide to the ECHR-guaranteed freedom of
association.96 The guide defines an association as any “organized, independent, not-for-profit body based on the voluntary
grouping of persons with a common interest, activity or purpose.”97 It relates the significance of the freedom to associate as
“a human right, crucial to the functioning of a democracy, as well
as an essential prerequisite for other fundamental freedoms.”98
Networks of CSOs are thus vital in a democratic society and play
an important role in promoting and protecting the public interest.99 The ODIHR and Venice Commission further acknowledged
92. Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Regular Procedure, ASYLUM INFO.
DATABASE, https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/hungary/asylumprocedure/procedures/regular-procedure (last visited Mar. 21, 2018).
93. BILL NO. T/625, supra note 10, § 250(4).
94. Id. § 250(2)(c).
95. ECHR, supra note 14, art. 11.
96. OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INST. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDELINES ON
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 5 (2015), https://www.osce.org/odihr/132371?download=true.
97. Id. at 15.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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the freedom of association the backbone of civil society as essential to the protection of other rights and freedoms for all people.100
In acknowledging the paramount importance of associations to
democratic institutions, the ECtHR has recognized that states
bear an affirmative responsibility to facilitate their functioning,
even if they operate in an adversarial role to the government.101
This infers, as the interpretive guide relays, an obligation to restrict the freedom of association only when necessary, using a
strict and narrow standard.102 Furthermore, laws restricting the
freedom of association should be clear and specific, promulgated
after thorough and inclusive legislative procedures, and subject
to impartial review.103 The disproportionate power of the Fidesz
Party in the Hungarian Parliament, combined with its influence
over the Constitutional Court, call into question both the inclusivity of legislative procedures and the impartiality of review.
The Stop Soros bills make punishable by imprisonment any
organizational activity that supports illegal immigration.104 Section 535/A(5)(c) specifies that the mere development of a network that functions to assist asylum and immigration constitutes a punishable organizational activity.105 Similarly, the special tax targets CSOs for “building and operating networks” that
support immigration.106 The ambiguity of the bills and potential
for broad applicability do not adhere to the precision called for
by the Venice Commission and the ODIHR, nor do they abide by
the affirmative responsibility to minimize any impediment made
by the government to the functioning of associations. Such legislation exemplifies a direct attack on the ability of CSOs to collaborate, and consequently, violates their freedom to associate.
IV. EXEMPTIONS TO THE RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION AND
ASSOCIATION: HUNGARY STILL IN VIOLATION
The Charter and the ECHR allow for permissible limitations
of both the freedom of expression and freedom of association insofar as the restrictions, with the aim of protecting an expressly
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 17.
Ouranio Toxo v. Greece, App. No. 74989/01, 2005-X Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 37.
OFFICE OF DEMOCRATIC INST. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 96, at 18.
Id.
BILL NO. T/333, supra note 5, § 353/A(2).
Id. § 353/A(5)(c).
BILL NO. T/625, supra note 10, § 250(2)(b).
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provided interest, are “prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society. . . .”107 They differ slightly in the ensuing
enumerated interests. Article 10 of the ECHR permits restrictions that are:
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.108

By contrast, Article 11 uses the following language:
in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the
armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the
State.109

The rights to freedom of expression and association are, therefore, lawfully restricted pursuant to an apparent tripartite
test.110 In the first prong, the restriction must be “prescribed by
law.”111 The second prong mandates that the restriction be in the
protection of an enumerated interest.112 Finally, the third prong
requires the restriction to be necessary in a democratic society
to protect that interest.113 The state must meet all three prongs
of the tripartite test and bears the burden of proof that the
prongs have been satisfied.114 It is further relevant to note that
Article 17 of the ECHR, as a threshold matter, prohibits any limits on freedoms enumerated within the ECHR that would effectively vitiate the rights as prescribed.115 Article 17 reads as follows:

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

ECHR, supra note 14, arts. 10 11.
Id. art. 10.
Id. art. 11.
Id. arts. 10(2) and 11(2).
Id.
Id.
Id.
BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, supra note 84, at 32 33.
ECHR, supra note 14, art. 17.
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[N]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a
greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.116

The ECtHR has imposed a strict interpretation standard on
these restrictions, namely in the case of The Sunday Times v. the
United Kingdom.117 The court stated the restrictions cannot be
interpreted beyond the ordinary meaning of the language used
and established a balancing test weighing the significance of the
ECHR-guaranteed freedom to the restricted party against the
government interest for its restriction.118
While the freedoms of expression and association would seemingly carry an inherently elevated level of significance given
their designation as fundamental by the Charter, the government is afforded a degree of deference by the ECtHR.119 Doctrinally, the ECtHR reserves for states a “margin of appreciation”
when it comes to interpreting the ECHR and its relationship to
domestic laws and restrictions.120 The ECtHR jurisprudence on
the scope of the margin of appreciation doctrine recognizes that
state governments, on account of their direct knowledge of and
interaction with domestic society, are best equipped to determine the necessity of laws and policies that would restrict an
Article 10 right.121
The margin of appreciation is not limitless, however, and the
court explained, “the requirements of proportionality and pressing social need had to be satisfied and domestic practice was subject to European supervision. . . .”122 As such, while the margin
of appreciation accords states a degree of deference concerning
the necessity on a restriction on enumerated freedoms, it is not

116. Id.
117. BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, supra note 84, at 33.
118. Id.
119. STEVEN GREER, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION: INTERPRETATION AND
DISCRETION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (2000).
120. Id.
121. The case referenced is Handyside v. the United Kingdom in 1976. It involved a dispute over the government seizure of the applicant’s stock of The
Little Red Schoolbook under the Obscene Publications Acts. The ECtHR used
this case to summarize its approach to the margin of appreciation. Id. at 37.
122. Id.
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determinative.123 Ultimately, the ECtHR is the final arbiter of
permissible derogations from the ECHR.124
A. Hungary’s Restrictions on Freedom of Expression and Association Are Not Adequately Prescribed by Law in the Stop Soros
Bills and Immigration Tax.
The first prong of the tripartite test for permissible restrictions
on both the freedoms of Articles 10 and 11 requires the derogation be prescribed by law.125 This means the restriction must be
pursuant to a codified domestic law that adequately affords implicated parties the requisite notice to adjust their conduct to
avoid violation.126 It is a principle value of legal systems and the
rule of law to provide certainty and foreseeability in order to
serve the dual purpose of (a) informing subjects of the law about
permissible and impermissible conduct and lawful compliance,
and (b) preventing arbitrary enforcement.127 The Venice Commission and ODIHR’s joint guide to freedom of association includes a list of guiding principles to the interpretation of Article
11.128 Principle 9, addressing whether a state’s derogation from
its obligation to respect the freedom of association is permissible,
states “the law concerned must be precise, certain and foreseeable” in order to be adequately prescribed by law.129
The ECtHR case law similarly mandates precision in the law.
In Hashman and Harrup v. the United Kingdom, the court held
that a restriction to Article 10 freedom of expression was not
prescribed by law because the law was so vague as to have failed
to provide the applicants with sufficient guidance on how to adjust their behavior for future compliance.130 The court reiterated
that standard in Gaweda v. Poland, holding that the relevant
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. ECHR, supra note 14, arts. 10(2) and 11(2).
126. JIM MURDOCH, COUNCIL OF EUR., PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF
THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (2002) (The “prescribed by law” language appears in ECHR
Articles 8 11. This Council of Europe Handbook discusses ECHR Article 9, but
the interpretation is equally valid and applicable to Articles 10 and 11.).
127. Id.
128. OFFICE OF DEMOCRATIC INST. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 96, at 24.
129. Id.
130. COUNCIL OF EUROPE ET AL., FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN EUROPE: CASELAW CONCERNING ARTICLE 10 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
8 (Mario Oetheimer ed., 2007).
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domestic law “was not formulated with sufficient precision to enable the applicant to regulate his conduct,” and as such “was not
prescribed by law’ within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the
Convention.”131
Hungary’s laws fail to satisfy this prong of the test because
they do not enable CSOs to regulate their conduct. Several provisions within the bills are sufficiently vague so as to leave their
applicability entirely in question. The Stop Soros bills criminalize organizational activities, including networking and the dissemination of information, that assist asylees whose claims are
not meritorious.132 In many cases, however, the merits of an asylum application are not known until a final determination by the
courts.133 Additionally, it is uncertain whether there is an intent
or knowledgeability requirement in the laws because the bills do
not indicate whether a CSO must know the asylum claim is meritless, or at what point that determination must be made, in order for the CSO to be found in violation. For instance, it is unclear whether a CSO that facilitates an asylum application it believes to be meritorious would be liable for criminal sanctions if
the asylee were to be denied asylum later on in the courts. Such
abundant ambiguities are likely to cause a chilling effect, in
which CSOs self-censor and self-restrict their conduct beyond
the scope of the law.134
The Stop Soros bills also hold criminally liable anyone who
provides “financial means for committing the criminal offence
specified in Subsection (1), or who regularly carries out such organi[z]ational activities. . . .”135 Here, again, the law is imprecise
and does not clearly relay conduct that would fail to comply. For
example, it is unclear whether a CSO that provides funding for
pro-bono lawyers who may occasionally, but not primarily, work
with asylees would constitute a violation of the law, thus inviting criminal sanctions. Additionally, the Parliament specified
that “regularly carries out” means an offender must partake in
131. Gaweda v. Poland, App. No. 26229/95, 2002-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 301, ¶ 48.
132. BILL NO. T/333, supra note 5, § 353/A(1).
133. Hungarian Helsinki Committee, supra note 92.
134. For a detailed discussion on the link between ambiguity in the law and
the chilling effect, see Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:
Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 694 701 (1978) (discussing
the concept of uncertainty and the chilling effect doctrine in the context of freedom of speech in the United States).
135. BILL NO. T/333, supra note 5, § 353/A(2).
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an impermissible organizational activity more than twice in “a
short period of time” relative to custom.136 The provision provides no further specification, leaving open to interpretation how
short a period of time must be to constitute noncompliance with
the bill.
Both the Stop Soros bills and the immigration tax sanction the
“building and operating” of networks related to assisting immigration, with no additional clarification.137 Such language is rife
with ambiguity. It fails to indicate the threshold of what constitutes a network how organized or linked various CSOs would
have to be and to what requisite degree their work must interrelate to promote a common purpose and how directly related
the associational activity must be to supporting immigration.
Even further, the tax imposes a 25 percent sanction on any
“propaganda activities that portray immigration in a positive
light.”138 Thus, a CSO that operates in the realm of immigration
would need to decipher what category of activities constitute
“propaganda” and “positive light.” For instance, it is unclear
whether the dissemination of fact-based information relating to
the asylum process may be construed as “positive” merely for not
disparaging immigration, or for highlighting facts the government opposes. The open-ended nature of multiple provisions
within the Stop Soros bills and the immigration tax fail to guide
CSOs towards a path to compliance and conduct regulation.
Beyond the vague language of the bills, their apparent contravention of Hungary’s international obligations furthers their
ambiguity. The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) assert, in Article 3, that
states cannot unilaterally legislate their way out of a breach of
an internationally wrongful act by promulgating contradictory
domestic law.139 Article 2 defines an internationally wrongful
act, in part, as a breach of a binding international obligation.140
The Stop Soros bills and immigration tax facially breach Hungary’s obligations under international law and EU mandates.
Thus, Hungary is likely committing an internationally wrongful
136. Id. at General Reasoning.
137. Id. § 353/A(5)(c); BILL NO. T/625, supra note 10, § 250(2)(b).
138. Bill No. T/ 625 §250(2)(c).
139. The first twenty-seven articles of ARSIWA are generally regarded as
customary international law. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fiftythird Session, U.N. Doc. A/55/10, at 36 38 (2000).
140. Id. at 34 36.
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act that cannot be rectified through shifting obligations under
domestic law.
Hungary is a signatory to the Refugee Convention, which
adopts the principles of non-refoulment and non-penalization.141
The principle of non-refoulment, found in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, prohibits state parties from returning an asylee
to a state where they face threats to their life or freedom.142 Article 31 of the Refugee Convention mandates that state parties
shall not penalize asylees who enter the state unlawfully, having
come directly from a country where they faced persecution.143
While the Fidesz Party seems to have interpreted the “coming
directly” language to validate their laws restricting asylum only
to those who did not travel through any states between the persecuting country and Hungary, the UNHRC drafters did not intend such an interpretation.144 The intention of that provision,
and indeed how it has predominantly been applied, was to preclude asylees who had safely and firmly resettled in a third country, while permitting asylum applications from those who
merely passed through other states en route to the State in
which they seek asylum.145 Thus, the Stop Soros bills contravene
the Refugee Convention by authorizing the criminal penalization of asylees and those who assist them, as well as the possible
refoulment of asylum applicants who seek refuge in Hungary.
In addition, the Stop Soros bills directly violate EU law, specifically International Protection Procedures Directive
2013/32.146 This directive, promulgated in 2013 by the EU Parliament and Council and binding on member states, guarantees
asylees a right to communicate with lawyers and organizations
141. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, 3 (2010), available at https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.
142. Refugee Convention, supra note 45, art. 33.
143. Id. art. 31.
144. Erika Feller, Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson, Summary Conclusions:
Article 31 of the 1951 Convention, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 253,
255 (Erika Fuller et al. eds., 2003), available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/470a33b20.html.
145. Id.
146. Directive 2013/32/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 June 2013 on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection (Recast), 2013 O.J. (L 108/60) art. 12(c), available at
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013L0032&from=en.
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that provide counsel.147 That guarantee is stipulated on the
grounds that the communication with CSOs providing counsel
be in accordance with the national law of the State; as such, it
can be inferred that the guarantee may be limited by national
law, but not entirely vitiated.148 The tension between binding international law and Hungary’s domestic legislation creates additional ambiguity that muddies the waters for CSOs to garner
clear guidance from the Stops Soros bills and immigration tax.
The Stop Soros bills and immigration tax as they stand would
seemingly force CSOs to disregard international obligations or
face sanctions for failing to comply. The ambiguities and conflict
between international and domestic law further diminish foreseeability and the opportunity for CSOs to regulate conduct.
B. Hungary’s Restrictions on Freedom of Expression and Association Are Not Aimed at Protecting an Enumerated Interest.
The second prong of the tripartite test for permissible derogations from ECHR Article 10 and 11 rights requires the restriction to aim to further an enumerated interest. The Hungarian Parliament expressly stated in the Stop Soros bills’ General
Reasoning section that the amendments were promulgated in
the name of national security.149 The Parliament posits that recent elections and referendums, where Hungarian citizens
elected Fidesz and upheld its anti-immigrant platform, indicate
the will of the people for Hungary to avoid becoming a country
of immigrants.150 As such, the government deems itself obliged
to protect those interests and subsequently denigrate immigration as a “serious risk” and matter of “national security.”151 By
contrast, the reasoning provided in the immigration tax amendments makes no mention of any enumerated interest specified
in Articles 10 or 11, instead stating the tax is justified in response to the perceived costs and burdens imposed on Hungarian society by the rise in immigration allegedly spurred by the
support of CSOs.152

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
BILL NO. T/333, supra note 5, at General Reasoning.
Id.
Id.
BILL NO. T/625, supra note 10, at Detailed Reasoning.
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While buffering the state budget is not an expressly permissible ground for restricting the freedoms of expression and association under Articles 10 and 11, protecting national security is.153
Therefore, on its face, the Stop Soros bills present a possible basis for exemption. Additionally, ECHR Article 15 permits derogation from an ECHR obligation “[i]n time of war or other public
emergency threatening the life of the nation” insofar as the derogations are “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law.”154 While states, in accordance with the margin of appreciation principle, are given deference in determining what constitutes a threat to national security, their assessment is not absolute.155
The Venice Commission and ODIHR’s joint guide to freedom
of association states, “[t]he scope of these legitimate aims shall
be narrowly interpreted,” recognizing the potential for states to
abuse fundamental freedoms in the name of national security if
given complete deference.156 The ECtHR has further recognized
the need for the courts to be the final determiner of legitimate
interests.157 In Case of Janowiec and Others v. Russia, the ECtHR explained that states have the obligation to show the basis
of a claim of national security is reasonably based in fact.158
Hungary would bear the burden of proof in arguing that the
influx of immigration and specifically asylum seekers and refugees poses a national security threat that is reasonable based
on the facts. While the scope of legitimate national security concerns has never been comprehensively enumerated, it is most
often successfully invoked in relation to “the protection of state
security and constitutional democracy from espionage, terrorism, support for terrorism, separatism and incitement to breach
military discipline.”159 While the Fidesz Party’s billboard and
media campaigns linking immigrants to terrorism and economic

153. ECHR, supra note 14, arts. 10 11.
154. Id. art. 15.
155. GREER, supra note 119, at 37.
156. OFFICE OF DEMOCRATIC INST. AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 96, at 24.
157. Eur. Ct. H.R. Research Division, National Security and European CaseLaw, 2 (2013), available at https://rm.coe.int/168067d214.
158. Janowiec v. Russia [GC], App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, 2013-V Eur.
Ct. H.R., ¶ 214.
159. Eur. Ct. H.R. Research Division, supra note 157, at 4.
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hardship successfully instilled widespread fear throughout Hungary, there has not been a known terrorist attack160 perpetrated
by a refugee in Hungary since the fall of communism in 1989.161
As such, it is unlikely Hungary would be able to successfully present a national security threat that is materially and factually
reasonable so as to justify derogation from the ECHR.162
C. Hungary’s Restrictions on Freedom of Expression and Association Are Not Necessary in a Democratic Society.
The final prong of the tripartite test, requiring any restriction
on Article 10 or 11 freedoms to be necessary in a democratic society, closely piggybacks off of the second prong. Whether or not
an enumerated interest, such as protecting national security, is
deemed legitimate may be determined by the necessity of the restriction imposed.163 The key principle in determining whether a
restriction or derogation is necessary in a democratic society is
proportionality; namely, a requirement that the government
may only impose restrictions limited to the degree that is required to accomplish the legitimate aim.164 A law that purports
to protect a legitimate aim, such as national security, but that
infringes on the freedom of expression and association far more
broadly than is necessary to achieve that aim, cannot be proportional.165
Proportionality is thus another balancing test that seeks the
route of least resistance. In Case of Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom, the ECtHR elaborated that the test for necessity and proportionality balances the severity of the punishment imposed by
160. Search
Results,
GLOBAL
TERRORISM
DATABASE,
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1989&end_yearonly=2017&dtp2=all&success=yes&country=90&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=1&count=100#resultstable (last visited Mar. 20, 2019) (search results from 1988 2017 in Hungary).
161. Drinoczi & Mohay, supra note 57.
162. Hungary did convict a Syrian refugee of under anti-terror laws in 2018
for crossing the border with Serbia illegally, but the sentence has been widely
condemned as a misuse of terrorism charges. Hungary Jails ‘Terrorist’ Over
Migrant Border Clash, BBC (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-43408662.
163. Eur. Ct. H.R. Research Division, supra note 157.
164. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 665 (8th ed. 2012).
165. Id. at 664.
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the government with its intended objectives.166 In Dudgeon, a
case concerning whether the United Kingdom’s sanctions on homosexual conduct were permissible restrictions of Article 8 and
14 ECHR rights, the court remarked that the “breadth and absolute character” of the UK laws and severe sanctions shifted
the balance towards disproportionality.167
The ECtHR has also found that governments must, when restricting a fundamental ECHR right, do so in a manner that imposes the least prejudice upon the right itself.168 In Castells v.
Spain, the ECtHR specially noted that “[t]he dominant position
which the government occupies makes it necessary for it to display restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly
where other means are available. . . .”169 The ECtHR caselaw
demonstrates the court’s generally critical lens when supervising state restrictions on fundamental freedoms, especially when
the means of restriction are broad and sweeping in a way that
abuses the state’s disparate power to vitiate the freedom holistically.
The Stop Soros bills and immigration tax would likely fail to
satisfy the necessity requirement. The punishment of up to a
year imprisonment or a heavy tax burden is severe, while the
legislation’s ability to further a legitimate aim is minimal. Already, the Stop Soros bills and immigration tax have destabilized civil society in Hungary without providing any tangible
protections in the name of national security.170 Following the
promulgation of the immigration tax bill in 2018, the Central
European University in Budapest171 almost immediately halted
its Open Leaning Initiative for asylees and refugees in fear of
the 25 percent tax.172 The initiative was aimed towards integrating asylees and refugees into Hungarian and European society
166. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 19, ¶ 59 (1981).
167. Id. ¶ 61.
168. Mouvement Raelien Suisse v. Switzerland [GC], App. No. 16354/06,
2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 373, ¶75 [hereinafter Mouvement Raelien Suisse].
169. Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 19, ¶ 46 (1992).
170. See, e.g., Soros University Says It[s] Being Forced Out of Hungary, Mulls
Move, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungarysoros-ceu/soros-university-says-it-being-forced-out-of-hungary-mulls-moveidUSKCN1MZ1TY.
171. The Central European University was founded by George Soros, the
namesake of the Stop Soros bills. Id.
172. Lydia Gall, University Program First Victim of Hungary Anti-Immigration
Tax,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(Aug.
29,
2018),
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by providing free educational resources and career and academic
advice.173 Thus, the laws have halted some assimilation initiatives, producing a result which seems counterintuitive to protecting public order. The Hungarian government has since
forced the Central European University out of its capital city altogether, demonstrating its willingness to boot a pest that uses
information and knowledge to counter government messaging.174
The potential for broad chilling effects resulting from ambiguities in the law, coupled with harsh punishments, push Hungary’s recent legislation into the realm of disproportionate restrictions on fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, the Stop Soros bills and immigration tax are so broad as to implicate large
portions of civil society that work in immigration, and they do so
without tailoring the impact to be minimally prejudicial.175 As
such, the restrictions posed by Hungary’s laws are disproportionate to any legitimate aim and are unnecessary in a democratic society.
V. REDRESS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN HUNGARY: JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE AVENUES
The European Union recognizes CSOs as vital to promoting
and protecting participatory democracy, transparent governance, social harmony and equality, and state legitimacy.176 The
Stop Soros bills and immigration tax threaten to significantly

https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/29/university-program-first-victim-hungary-anti-immigration-tax.
173. Id.
174. Susan Adams, Why Hungary Forced George Soros-Backed Central European University To Leave The Country, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2018/12/04/why-hungary-forcedgeorge-soros-backed-central-european-university-to-leave-the-country/.
175. The Mouvement Raelien Suisse case noted that, in order for a restriction
on a freedom to be permissible under the necessity and proportionality prong
of the exemptions, it must be implemented specifically so as to minimize prejudice to the party whose freedom is being restricted. Mouvement Raelien
Suisse, supra note 168, ¶ 75.
176. The Roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development: Europe’s Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations, at 3, COM (2012) 492 final (Dec.
9,
2012),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM%3A2012%3A0492%3AFIN%3AEN%3APDF.
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undermine the work of CSOs in immigration or tangentially related fields and continue a trend within Hungary to subvert civic
engagement and CSOs’ ability to check the government.
Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) enumerates democracy as a paramount and foundational value of the
European Union.177 Orbán’s steady march to aggrandize power,
including rewriting the constitution, crippling the judiciary, consolidating control over the media, and undermining civil society,
all pose a significant and imminent threat to democracy in Hungary.178 TEU Article 7 provides mechanisms for the EU to protect Article 2 values from its own member states, but it falls
short.179 The EU has attempted to sanction Hungary, and even
Poland in the past, but it lacks sufficient procedures to do so.180
In order to impose Article 7 sanctions on Hungary, including a
temporary suspension of voting rights, the EU would need the
Council of the European Union to unanimously agree, along with
a two-thirds majority of the EU Parliament, that “a serious and
persistent breach of EU values has taken place.”181 While the EU
Parliament met the two-thirds majority requirement to sanction
Hungary in September 2018, the potential for discipline is ultimately minimal.182 In reality, the unanimous requirement in the
Council effectively gives Poland, an ally of Hungary, veto power,
which handcuffs the EU’s ability to take punitive measures.183
Therefore, in order for the EU to back up its bark with any
bite, it would need to amend the TEU and TFEU to provide procedural mechanisms to eliminate the effective veto power of allied states. Here again, however, the provisions of those very
treaties seem to stymie the EU’s ability to enforce and maintain
its values. Article 48 of the TEU, concerning procedural require-

177. Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union art. 2, June
7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 1 [hereinafter TEU].
178. Bánkuti et al., supra note 18, at 140.
179. Reality Check Team, What Sanctions Can the EU Impose on Hungary?,
BBC (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45485994; TEU, supra
note 177, art. 7.
180. EU Parliament Votes to Punish Hungary Over ‘Breaches’ of Core Values,
BBC (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45498514.
181. Reality Check Team, supra note 179.
182. Patrick Kingsley & Steven Erlanger, Hungary’s Democracy Is in Danger,
E.U. Parliament Decides, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/world/europe/hungary-eu-viktor-orban.html.
183. Reality Check Team, supra note 179.
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ments for revising and amending EU treaties, allows for a simple majority vote of the EU Parliament or Commission to examine proposed amendments.184 Once a convention is called, however, treaty revisions and amendments must be ratified unanimously by all member states.185 Thus, the EU faces a similar
procedural impediment as those handcuffing its ability to impose sanctions on Hungary; if amending treaties to enable sanctions requires unanimity, then Hungary and Poland can again
create a roadblock to protect their interests.
The significance of the Parliamentary two-thirds vote to sanction Hungary is not entirely lost despite the roadblocks in the
Council of the European Union and Article 48 TEU. The Fidesz
Party is a member of the European People’s Party (EPP), a conservative alliance within the EU Parliament that has generally
served to safeguard Orbán from punitive measures.186 In the
September 2018 vote to sanction Hungary, however, 115 members of the EPP over half of the EPP voted to bring Article 7
sanctions against Hungary.187 This shift indicates a rising concern over Hungary’s assault on democracy, even among its center-right allies in the Parliament.188 While this swing is promising, it is unlikely to be widespread enough to meet the unanimity
requirement.189 Therefore, the language of the EU treaties disproportionately empowers countries in violation of EU values by
requiring only one vote in favor of Hungary to buffer it from any
significant consequence.
While effective legislative avenues for redress would seemingly require an overhaul of EU treaty procedures, CSOs in Hungary and other EU or Council of Europe member states can still
counter Hungary in the judiciary. Individual CSOs or Council of
Europe states can bring claims against Hungary for ECHR violations in the ECtHR.190 Likewise, EU member states or the
Commission can bring claims for violations of the Charter in the

184. TEU, supra note 177, art. 48(3).
185. Id. art. 48(4).
186. Kingsley & Erlanger, supra note 182.
187. Id.
188. EU Parliament Votes to Stop Hungary’s ‘Threat’ to Democracy, SBS
NEWS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.sbs.com.au/news/eu-parliament-votes-tostop-hungary-s-threat-to-democracy.
189. Reality Check Team, supra note 179.
190. ECHR, supra note 14, art. 34.
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Court of Justice of the European Union.191 According to Articles
258 and 259 TFEU,192 the Commission or EU member states
may bring claims in the CJEU for violations of EU treaty obligations.193
For violations of the ECHR, contracting states and even individuals and NGOs may bring claims against Hungary in the ECtHR.194 State parties to the ECHR may bring such claims against
another state party for violations of the ECHR, though this is
exceptionally rare.195 For individuals and NGOs, the party may
initiate proceedings if it claims a direct harm or “significant disadvantage” resulting from a state’s violation of the ECHR.196 In
addition, all applicants must satisfy exhaustion requirements,
in accordance with international law, and bring claims within
six months of the final domestic ruling.197 In customary international law, exhaustion of local remedies, primarily through domestic courts or administrative agencies, is required, barring exceptional circumstances.198 Such exceptional circumstances
would include cases where domestic redress would be futile because the party would be denied justice outright, or the justice
received would be ineffective. Most often, futility occurs when
there exists no domestic avenues for recourse, or the avenues
available render either discriminatory and unjust decisions or
would provide ineffective or unduly delayed redress.199 Orbán
and the Fidesz Party’s effective control of the judiciary in Hungary would likely render domestic redress impossible and, therefore, provide the basis for an exemption from custom on futility
grounds.

191. Competences of the Court of Justice of the European Union, EUR. PARL.
(2018), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.3.10.pdf.
192. TFEU, supra note 44, arts. 258 59.
193. Id.
194. ECHR, supra note 14, arts. 33 34.
195. Eur. Ct. H.R., Inter-States Applications (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/InterStates_applications_ENG.pdf
196. ECHR, supra note 14, art. 34.
197. Id. art. 35.
198. A. O. Adede, A Survey of Treaty Provisions on the Rule of Exhaustion of
Local Remedies, 18 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 1, 5 (1977).
199. Id. at 15.
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CONCLUSION
The 2015 migrant crisis inadvertently shined a light on the
fractures between Hungary and the EU and European Community when it comes to Europe’s most foundational values. Hungary’s xenophobic response to the influx of refugees and asylees
laid bare its willingness to subvert its own civil society to fortify
Hungary against those seeking refuge. In his State of the Nation
address in February 2018, Orbán warned that the migrant crisis
would destroy Western culture and identity and cause the downfall of Europe.200 Yet, ironically, Orbán’s very response to that
perceived threat has posed a direct attack on the most core European value: democracy.
Orbán’s successful attempts to control the media, aggrandize
power for the Fidesz Party in Parliament, and undercut the
reach and power of the judiciary has shifted Hungary towards
autocracy.201 The Stop Soros bills and immigration tax are yet
another assault on balanced political influence in Hungary. By
now targeting civil society, Orbán has not only minimized checks
and balances within political institutions, but has also silenced
opposition in the public sector. Furthermore, Hungary has done
so in flagrant disregard for its international obligations.
The judicial avenues for redress available to CSOs in Hungary
through both the EU and Council of Europe institutions provide
a possible bulwark against Hungary’s anti-democratic legislation on a case-by-case basis. The lack of available sanctions
within the EU, however, pose questions about its very legitimacy
and efficacy. An institutional system of law and geopolitics that
prevents the EU from providing redress and protection for civil
society in Hungary is a system fundamentally at odds with its
founding principles.202 The EU cannot premise to be founded on
democratic values while standing idle as its members repeatedly
and pervasively undermine the very foundation of democratic
functions: civic engagement and the freedoms of expression and
association. Failing to provide, at the EU’s founding, an expulsion failsafe against states that trample on democratic principles

200. Orbán, supra note 1.
201. Bánkuti et al., supra note 18, at 139 40.
202. The Editorial Board, The EU Needs to Take a Stand Against Hungary’s
Viktor Orbán, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/6ea7b452-b5ac-11e8-bbc3-ccd7de085ffe.
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was an error of oversight in good faith.203 Failing to correct that
error now, however, threatens to subjugate democracy to the
whims of autocratic leaders and to compromise the EU, and its
institutional legitimacy, at its core.
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